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Abstract 
Despite their other theoretical differences, virtually all scholars of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) agree that the organisation’s members share an 
almost religious commitment to the norm of non-intervention. This article disrupts 
this consensus, arguing that ASEAN repeatedly intervened in Cambodia’s internal 
political conflicts from 1979-1999, often with powerful and destructive effects. 
ASEAN’s role in maintaining Khmer Rouge occupancy of Cambodia’s UN seat, 
constructing a new coalition government-in-exile, manipulating Khmer refugee camps 
and informing the content of the Cambodian peace process will be explored, before 
turning to the ‘creeping conditionality’ for ASEAN membership imposed after the 
1997 ‘coup’ in Phnom Penh. The article argues for an analysis recognising the 
political nature of intervention, and seeks to explain both the creation of non-
intervention norms, and specific violations of them, as attempts by ASEAN elites to 
maintain their own illiberal, capitalist regimes against domestic and international 
political threats. 
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ASEAN Intervention in Cambodia: From Cold War to Conditionality 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Discussion of ASEAN’s normative regimes like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) and the Zone of Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), resistance to human rights 
criticism, or the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Acharya, 2001; Tang, 
1995; Leifer, 1996) have all emphasised the cardinal norms of ‘rigidly demarcated 
and sacrosanct boundaries, mutual recognition of sovereign political entities, and non-
intervention in the affairs of other states’, apparently proving Mohammed Ayoob’s 
(1995: 71) observation that ‘third-world elites have internalised these values to an 
astonishing degree’. To such a degree, indeed, that this paralysed ASEAN during and 
since the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Analysts referred to ASEAN’s ‘non-
intervention problem’, declaring that ‘either interference becomes legitimate, or the 
Association will become increasingly meaningless. The ASEAN Way ends 
here’(Moller, 1998: 1104).1 This article challenges this consensus by showing that 
ASEAN states repeatedly intervened in the internal political conflicts of Cambodia 
between 1979, when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge, 
and 1999, when Cambodia was finally admitted to ASEAN.  
 
The Cambodian case is complex, raising many issues and resisting easy 
summarisation. It is chosen here because of its well-recognised centrality to the unity 
and development of ASEAN in the 1980s. Its selection also highlights the 
indeterminacy of the literature on ASEAN norms. During this period Cambodia was 
not an ASEAN member, and so it might simply be argued that ASEAN’s ‘norms’ did 
not apply or were not violated by intervention. However, the virtually uncontested 
interpretation of ASEAN’s stance on Cambodia was that it was motivated by 
‘embarrassment’ at the violation of its ‘cherished’ norm of non-intervention by 
Vietnam, and did not intervene itself (e.g., Acharya, 2000: 79-129; Alagappa, 1993; 
Antolik, 1990: 116; Leifer, 1999: 35). This strongly implies that despite the absence 
of Vietnam and Cambodia from its ranks, ASEAN acted as if the norm extended to 
Indochina. However, this article will demonstrate that despite its rhetorical adherence 
to non-interference, ASEAN repeatedly violated its own norms in response to 
Vietnam’s behaviour. This challenges the claim that ASEAN states’ identities and 
interests had been ‘transformed’ by norms via a process of ‘socialisation’, as the 
‘security community’ literature argues (Acharya, 2001), and falsifies Leifer’s (1999: 
35-6) assertion that ASEAN’s approach to Cambodia from 1997-99 was only the 
second time it had ever intervened in the internal affairs of another country.2 
 
Beginning with a political, historicised reading of ASEAN’s non-intervention norms, 
the article traces ASEAN’s intervention (understood as coercive interference in an 
external political community) through the second Cold War and into the 1990s, 
drawing a contrast between the strong intervention of the 1980s, driven by the 
imperative to contain revolution, and the weaker intervention of the 1990s, driven 
mainly by a need to maintain a suspect claim to manage regional order.3  
 
ASEAN’s Non-Interference Norms: A Politicised Reading 
 
As Lee Kuan Yew (2000: 369-70) states, ASEAN’s prime raison d’être was to 
facilitate the continued survival of authoritarian capitalist regimes threatened by 
internal subversion and the external pressure of the Cold War: 
 
[t]he unspoken objective was to gain strength through solidarity ahead of the power vacuum that 
would come with an impending British and later a possible US withdrawal… We had a common 
enemy – the communist threat in guerrilla insurgencies, backed by North Vietnam, China and 
the Soviet Union. We needed stability and growth to counter and deny the communists the social 
and economic conditions for revolutions… While ASEAN’s declared objectives were economic, 
social and cultural, all knew that progress in economic cooperation would be slow. We were 
banding together more for political objectives, stability and security.  
 
ASEAN was made possible, as Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik pointed out, 
by the ‘convergence in the political outlook of the five prospective member-nations’ 
(Khong, 1997: 327) after Sukarno’s crusading anti-imperialism was brought to a 
bloody end by Suharto’s New Order regime. The alignment of reactionary capitalist 
regimes across the sub-region allowed leaders to cooperate in defeating the key 
threats to their rule: internal subversion, particularly the threat of communist 
revolution, against which most ASEAN states had concluded bilateral arrangements 
by the late 1970s (Snitwongse, 1995: 521).  
 
ASEAN’s key ‘norms’ of non-interference, enshrined in the 1967 ASEAN 
Declaration, the 1971 ZOPFAN Declaration and the 1976 TAC, merely reiterate, in a 
strict tone, rules already articulated in the UN Charter. That these rules already 
existed elsewhere begs the question as to why ASEAN would want to recapitulate 
them. The answer lies in the timing and political functions of each declaration. The 
ASEAN Declaration aimed to halt the rampant intervention against each other’s rule 
that had characterised regional international relations hitherto, ‘to ensure [members’] 
stability and security from external interference in any form… in order to preserve 
their national identities’ (ASEAN, 1967). The goal was to give authoritarian elites 
sufficient latitude to engage in violent political consolidation in an era when ‘national 
identities’ were weak or non-existent. ZOPFAN and TAC were direct responses to the 
deteriorating international environment and the rising power of communist 
insurgencies. By the mid-1970s, for example, Thailand and the Philippines had both 
succumbed to dictatorships in reaction to deepening economic malaise and the 
growing leftist threat to entrenched economic and political power structures. Marxist 
guerrillas were active throughout those countries, effectively ruling over hundreds of 
thousands of people (Alexander, 1999: 314; Anderson, 1998: 171-83; Kessler, 1989; 
Girling, 1981: 257).  
 
To deny the opening for great power intervention provided by civil strife in 
Indochina, ASEAN vowed to strengthen ‘national resilience’ to ensure ‘stability and 
security from external interference… in order to preserve… national identities’ 
(ASEAN, 1971). But with the onset of the Nixon Doctrine, ASEAN had to go further 
and ‘reserve’, as Marcos put it, ‘the right to make our own accommodations with the 
emerging realities in Asia’ (Silverman, 1975: 920-1). TAC, emerging in the context of 
the enormous boost given to the region’s communist movements by revolutionary 
victory in Indochina in 1975, stressed ‘mutual respect for the independence, 
sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations’, ‘the 
right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion, or coercion’ and ‘non-interference in the affairs of one another’ (ASEAN, 
1976). ASEAN hoped to contain the spread of revolution by offering this quid pro 
quo to Indochina’s new communist states, in the vain hope they would adopt a self-
denying ordinance. 
 
ASEAN’s international ‘norm’ of non-intervention was actually a domestically-
determined political principle, developed to defend weak, capitalist regimes from 
externally sponsored revolution. As Justin Rosenberg argues, ‘the “international” has 
also been very much about the management of change in domestic political orders… a 
counter-revolutionary foreign policy is rarely just a foreign policy. To a degree which 
varies with individual cases it is also directed inwards, a nationalist identification of 
certain programmes of domestic political change with a foreign threat’ (Rosenberg, 
1994: 35). Since interventions are essentially actions designed to change political 
outcomes in an external political community, we could regard as interventionist such 
actions as Malaysia’s military aid against communist guerrillas in Indonesian Borneo, 
successful Malaysian-Indonesian efforts to defuse the Muslim insurgency in the 
southern Philippines, and ASEAN’s backing of Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor. 
That such actions were welcomed indicates that what ASEAN elites sought to defend 
was not an abstract normative principle but their own precarious social orders – all of 
which were shored up in these instances. The same pattern is expressed in Thailand’s 
sponsorship of armed rebel groups in Burma on the understanding that they would 
help crush the Communist Party of Thailand and prevent it linking up with the 
Communist Party of Burma (Smith, 1991: 297-99). When Vietnam invaded Cambodia 
in December 1978, overthrowing Pol Pot and installing a new government, the 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), and forcing Khmer Rouge (KR) remnants to 
flee to the Thai border, it raised the spectre of spreading revolution and toppling 
‘dominoes’.4 Despite their rhetorical adherence to the ‘norm’ of non-intervention, 
ASEAN was driven by this spectre to intervene in the Cambodian conflict. 
 
 
Intervention in the 1980s: Representation, Rebels and Refugees 
 
Representation: ASEAN’s UN Activism on behalf of the Khmer Rouge 
 
The UN Security Council considered Vietnam’s intervention in January and February 
1979, but was paralysed by Sino-Soviet rivalry. The USSR vetoed proposed 
resolutions against its Vietnamese ally, while Beijing invaded northern Vietnam to 
‘punish’ Hanoi for overthrowing its client regime in Cambodia. Attention thus shifted 
to the UN General Assembly (UNGA). 
 
The question of who gets to represent a state at the UN is normally a purely 
bureaucratic process overseen by the Credentials Committee, whose annual reports 
are usually rubber-stamped without debate by the UNGA. ASEAN politicised this 
process by successfully campaigning each year for the KR to keep Cambodia’s UN 
seat. This was a move without precedent and carried serious consequences for the 
balance of forces inside Cambodia. Using the rhetoric of a defence of non-
intervention, ASEAN mobilised third-world states in the UNGA to vote against the 
PRK’s credentials in favour of those of Democratic Kampuchea (DK), represented by 
Ieng Sary, Pol Pot’s deputy; sponsored critical annual resolutions on the ‘Situation in 
Kampuchea’; and hijacked Vietnam’s counter-debates on ‘Peace and Stability in 
Southeast Asia’ to lambaste Hanoi.  
 ASEAN argued that the PRK was a ‘puppet regime’ established by armed 
intervention, and that seating it would endorse violations of basic norms of 
international conduct (A/34/PV.4: 37-8; A/34/PV.4: 51; A/34/PV.62: 1195, 1210; 
A/34/PV.65: 1251; A/35/PV.34: 687, etc).5 Ambassador Romulo of the Philippines 
argued, for instance, that seating the PRK would ‘set in train a fatal sequence of 
events… the small and weak nations of the world’ would lose ‘the right to exist 
except under conditions of bondage and servility’ (A/35/PV.35: 716). The rhetorical 
linkage of the Cambodian conflict to the UN Charter principles and the majority 
interests of weak states allowed Singaporean Ambassador Koh to claim that ‘our 
opposition to Vietnam’s action is based upon principle’ and ‘the right of DK to retain 
its seat in the UN has become coterminous with the defence of certain fundamental 
principles of the Charter of the UN’ (A/34/PV.62: 1209; A/35/PV.34: 689).  
 
It would be easy to take such rhetoric as a sign of commitment to the non-intervention 
norm, as many constructivists do. Comparing ASEAN’s campaign to its reaction to 
other interventions, however, reveals its stance as political, not principled. The closest 
parallel is the January 1979 Tanzanian intervention in Uganda which overthrew Idi 
Amin. The circumstances prompting the intervention were similar; Tanzania 
advanced a ‘two wars’ thesis identical Vietnam’s, claiming it acted in self-defence 
while a simultaneous indigenous uprising actually overthrew the government; and 
Tanzanian troops remained in Uganda for several years, policing the post-war 
political settlement. Yet by 1980, the new regime was seated at the UN, was 
recognised by over 80 governments, and ASEAN had raised no hue and cry (Amer, 
1992: 207-9; Tesón, 1997: 116; Wheeler, 2000: 119-20; A/34/500/Add.1; 
A/34/500/Add.1: 3). The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the same year likewise 
produced little reaction from ASEAN members. Only two spoke at the UN debate and 
ASEAN rejected Thailand’s suggested joint statement and ‘restructuring’ of SEATO. 
Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi admitted this was because the intervention had ‘no 
direct bearing’ on the region (S/13724/Add.1; S/PV.2185: 5; Van der Kroef, 1980: 
488-9). The new regime was seated at the UN with only a handful of hollow 
reservations, with Singapore, a member of the Credentials Committee, voting in 
favour – hardly a robust defence of ‘principle’ (A/35/484: 2-4). Nor had ASEAN 
campaigned against France’s 1978 intervention to overthrow the Central African 
Empire’s government; the new regime was seated without a formal vote (A/35/PV.35: 
704-5, 709-10; A/36/PV.103: 1871-2).  
 
ASEAN’s campaign was thus deeply politicised. Its interventions were crucial. It was 
exceptional for an overthrown government to retain its UN seat, and it carried serious 
consequences for the course of the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN was thereby able to 
deny Vietnam and the PRK victory, and to use the UN and its organs to propagate its 
view of the conflict. ASEAN’s campaign of isolation also deprived the PRK of the 
usual aid and development assistance usually afforded to poor countries (e.g. from 
UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP), the IMF, World Bank, etc), which made it 
harder for the new government to achieve ‘performance legitimacy’(Alagappa, 1995), 
despite its domestic supremacy. Finally, the UN seat was ASEAN’s bargaining chip, 
without which, as Ambassador Koh put it, there would be ‘no incentive [for Vietnam] 
to negotiate a political settlement’ favourable to ASEAN’s interests (A/35/PV.34: 
689).  
 
Rebels and Refugees: Thailand’s Aid to the Khmer Rouge 
 
Just as DK’s survival at the UN was impossible without ASEAN backing, so the KR’s 
military survival was impossible without Thai assistance. Ieng Sary was saved from 
Vietnamese capture by being airlifted to safety by Thai forces. By January 1979 the 
Thais had prepared camps for KR soldiers on Thai soil, where they were fed, given 
medical treatment, and sent back over the border to fight the Vietnamese. While the 
border was mined to keep fleeing refugees out, Thai army trucks took KR soldiers 
across at safe points away from Vietnamese forces. Thai generals confirmed that this 
direct violation of the international law on neutrality was official policy. KR bases 
were established on Thai soil and the island of Khemara Phumin was fortified as an 
entrepôt for Chinese arms. By 1980, Thailand was accused of shipping 500 tons of 
arms to the KR every month. US intelligence estimated Thailand’s army funnelled 
$100m of arms annually to the KR during the 1980s. Thai artillery was often used to 
cover KR forays into Cambodia and Thai soldiers would frequently interpose 
themselves to prevent ‘hot pursuit’ by Vietnamese forces (BP, 1979; Daily Telegraph, 
1979a, 1979b; Guardian, 1979; Kiernan, 2002: 488; Shui, 2002; ST, 1979b, 1979c, 
1979a; Van der Kroef, 1990: 235).  
 
Without Thailand’s assistance, the KR could not have survived as a threat to the PRK. 
Chinese and Thai aid allowed the KR to rebuild its forces from under 2,000 to around 
40,000. This brought enormous dividends to Thailand’s military regime. Most 
importantly, Beijing dropped its support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), 
urging it to sign a truce, suspending the provision of broadcasting facilities in Yunnan 
province, and declaring by 1981 that it would not allow the CPT to sour Sino-Thai 
relations (Alexander, 1999: 316). Chinese aid to the Bangkok regime totalled $283m 
from 1985-89 alone, and the military also gained preferential access to advanced 
weapons technology and oil (Kiernan, 1993: 218; Shawcross, 1984: 126). This, and 
the rhetoric surrounding the communist threat allowed the military to control a fifth of 
the national budget by 1982, shoring up the capitalist dictatorship (Paribatra, 1984: 
40-41). Assisting the KR also created a buffer zone to contain the possible spread of 
revolution, and ensured that authority within Cambodia remained contested, which 
legitimised ASEAN’s continued activism on behalf of DK. As DK’s representative at 
the UN recognised, ‘if the fundamental struggle were to be eliminated, there would be 
no reason for our debates here, because the Hanoi expansionists would already have 
achieved in the field the fait accompli of their invasion of Kampuchea’ (A/36/PV.36: 
722). 
 
ASEAN’s treatment of refugees fleeing Cambodia was also designed to harm the 
PRK. Initially, ASEAN states sought to keep the refugees out, believing them to be 
‘fifth columnists’ sent to foment revolution. A senior Thai officer estimated that ‘at 
least 10 per cent’ were ‘Hanoi spies’ sent to ‘undermine the government’, and 
Bangkok forcibly repatriated tens of thousands into minefields, killing many. 
Singapore called refugees ‘human bombs’, refusing to accept any, while Malaysia 
threatened to deport 65,000 of them and adopt a ‘shoot-on-sight’ policy (Antolik, 
1990: 117; Mysliwec, 1988: 95-6; Observer, 1979; Richardson, 1982: 102-7). 
However, this anti-communist hysteria gave way to a more manipulative policy when 
‘the strategic value of the refugees as a buffer along the border and as a source of 
support for the re-emerging resistance movement’ was recognised (Terry, 2002: 119). 
Thailand declined to classify those crossing the border as refugees, thereby denying 
them international legal protection and ensuring that the lead agencies on the border 
would be the WFP and UNICEF, not the UNHCR with its powerful protection 
mandate (Amer, 1996: 121). This allowed the refugees to be manipulated in three 
crucial ways. 
 
First, they were used as a population base for the KR and the other resistance factions, 
which included the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF, led by Son 
Sann, a former Cambodian Prime Minister who declared his own liberation 
government) and Moulinaka (a royalist group led ostensibly by Prince Sihanouk, the 
former head of state). With the assistance of Thai Task Force 80, civilians were kept 
captive in these groups’ camps, to which tens of thousands of refugees were forcibly 
transferred from temporary UNHCR facilities. The UN Border Relief Organisation 
(UNBRO), set up by the WFP upon its withdrawal in 1983, reported that by 1987 the 
guerrillas controlled all of the refugee camps and over 260,000 civilians. ASEAN 
campaigned annually for UN aid, 50 to 90 per cent of which was directly appropriated 
for the war effort. A ‘top UN official’ admitted in 1987 that ‘the border operation is a 
political operation. It’s the UN system being used to keep the game going’. Another 
remarked, ‘if the UN stopped feeding the soldiers’ wives and families, the resistance 
would stop’ (Terry, 2002: 73, 115, 130-1, 137-9; Vickery, 1987: 318-20; NYT, 
1979a; Mysliwec, 1988: 99). Second, the refugees were used to ‘shame’ Vietnam and 
provide ‘proof’ of the PRK’s unpopularity (though most refugees were fleeing Thai-
facilitated warfare). Michael Vickery argued that the UNHCR camp at Khao-I-Dang 
was deliberately established to attract refugees across the border to assist in these 
efforts, only to be closed in 1987 when civilians began fleeing the resistance camps en 
masse (Vickery, 1987: 309-10). Third, the refugees formed a useful, flexible ‘human 
buffer’. Whenever the Vietnamese launched offensives against the resistance camps, 
such as their 1979 and 1983 raids on KPNLF headquarters at Nong Chang (located on 
Cambodian soil), ASEAN issued shrill denunciations, claiming Vietnam was 
‘invading’ Thailand and ‘slaughtering’ Cambodian innocents in refugee camps: the 
resultant outcry induced Vietnam to withdraw. However, Thailand had actually 
provoked both attacks by seeking to smuggle thousands of guerrillas into Cambodia 
under the guise of ‘refugee repatriation’ (Van der Kroef, 1981: 519; 1983: 19; 
Vickery, 1987: 317; A/35/PV.35: 705). This buffer of human misery also proved most 
lucrative for the Thai army and the KR, which controlled the local black-market trade. 
Cross-border trade was estimated at $500,000 per day by 1983, and by 1989, the KR 
were earning $2.4m per month from territory they controlled with Thai assistance 
(Van der Kroef, 1983: 26; Um, 1989: 101).  
 
Representation: ASEAN and the Formation of the CGDK 
 
The military imperative of merging the Khmer resistance groups into a ‘united front’, 
and the diplomatic imperative of distancing ASEAN from a genocidal regime 
prompted ASEAN to begin leading the attempt, as Lee Kuan Yew put it, ‘to preserve 
the DK seat in the UN and alter the leadership of the Government of DK’ 
(Saravanamuttu, 1996; ST, 1980a, 1980b), since Sihanouk and others had refused the 
genocidaires’ request to unite (NYT, 1979b; ST, 1979d; IHT, 1979; Yomiuri 
Shinbun, 1979). The urgency of this task increased when the EEC hinted it might vote 
against DK at the UN in 1982. ASEAN feared that others might follow suit, leading 
eventually to the recognition of the by-now-enraged PRK (Tasker, 1982). ASEAN 
thus redoubled its efforts, using a raft of incentives and threats. 
 After nine unsuccessful meetings in Bangkok, Son Sann was invited for secret talks in 
Singapore in April 1981 (Tasker, 1982; ST, 1981c). By May, Singapore’s Foreign 
Minister explained that the aim was no longer a ‘united front’ but a ‘coalition 
government’ as ‘the term… carries with it more authority, legitimacy and 
permanence’ (ST, 1981e). Lee publicly warned the KR that they ‘must recognise that 
the alternative to this is the eventual legitimising of the Vietnamese puppet regime in 
Kampuchea’ (ST, 1980b) – a powerful threat coming from DK’s champion at the UN.  
Singapore pledged to support the non-communist resistance ‘in every possible way’ –  
but only if they joined the coalition (Japan Times, 1981), denouncing Son Sann when 
his intransigence stalled negotiations. Thailand threatened to cut off aid to the KPNLF 
altogether, while cajoling Sihanouk into participating by promising to support his 
post-war plans for Cambodia (ST, 1981b, 1981e, 1981a; Simon, 1982b: 204; Quinn-
Judge, 1981; Chanda, 1981). In September, Siddhi embarked on a month-long trip to 
secure support for the coalition in the West, and in October Singapore brokered a 
breakthrough agreement to install Sihanouk as President, Son Sann as Prime Minister 
and the KR’s Khieu Samphan as Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, with 
Malaysia pledging aid to give ‘beef and teeth’ to the coalition when full agreement 
was reached (FT, 1981; ST, 1981d; 1982). Negotiations on the coalition’s operating 
parameters were subsequently stalled by KR intransigence, so ASEAN once again 
stoked speculation that DK would lose its UN seat if a coalition was not formed 
(Sricharatchanya, 1982). Finally on the eve of the factions’ meeting in Kuala Lumpur 
on 22 June 1982, Malaysia offered ‘all out economic assistance’ in the event of a 
coalition, on top of the food, clothes and arms already promised (Xinhua, 1982a; ST, 
1982). Under this welter of carrots and sticks, the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) was finally formed. 
 
Siddhi’s claim that the formation of the coalition was a ‘domestic affair and the task 
of the Kampuchean people’ and that ‘neither Thailand nor ASEAN has interfered in 
this affair’ is obviously false (Xinhua, 1982b). The key negotiations for the coalition’s 
formation took place in ASEAN capitals, not on Kampuchean soil, amidst intense 
ASEAN diplomacy, cajoling, threats and promises, without the involvement of the 
heavily-invoked ‘Kampuchean people’, with CGDK leaders openly praising 
ASEAN’s coordinating role. Throughout the 1980s, ASEAN diplomacy repeatedly 
‘re-activated’ Sihanouk after multiple resignations over KR abuses in order to keep 
the coalition together (Tasker, 1982; The Nation, 1983; Chanda, 1987).  
 
The construction of the CGDK radically altered the leadership of the government-in-
exile: to ‘dilute’ the KR’s influence and create a ‘nationalist’ alternative to the 
communist regime had been an explicit ASEAN aim (Evans and Rowley, 1984: 266-
8). Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry explained that the goal was to ‘beef up’ the non-
communist forces, gradually displace the KR and thereby ‘increase the chances of the 
non-communist forces returning to Phnom Penh through a political settlement’ (ST, 
1981f). ASEAN was now able to exploit the involvement of Sihanouk, a revered 
founding father of the Non-Aligned Movement, to increase support for its strategy. 
Explanatory statements indicated his presence was an important factor in increasing 
the majority in favour of CGDK recognition at the UN in 1982 (Amer, 1990: 54). The 
‘dilution’ of the KR’s role also allowed Western states to respond to ASEAN’s calls 
for assistance. This was particularly crucial after the Vietnamese 1984-85 dry season 
offensive virtually wiped out the CGDK’s camps. Washington responded with an 
influx of $20m, and annual aid ranged from $17m to $32m thereafter (Mysliwec, 
1988: 83; Kiernan, 1993: 199). However, Jakarta rejected Singapore’s suggestion of 
direct ASEAN military aid for the CGDK, threatening to leave ASEAN over the 
matter (Sricharatchanya, 1981). Notably, Jakarta was unwilling to legitimise 
ASEAN’s behaviour by appealing to a right of counter-intervention, nor to confront 
Hanoi militarily, even via a proxy, since this would openly compromise ASEAN’s 
‘offended bystander’ routine. Nevertheless, with Singapore leading the way, a covert 
Singaporean-Malaysian-Thai-American group was convened regularly in Bangkok to 
coordinate assistance to the CGDK. This included arms, ammunition, training, 
communications equipment, food, and the establishment of a Khmer-language 
KPNLF radio station with British assistance. The three ASEAN states dispensed just 
under $70m and were critical in persuading Washington to participate (Lee, 2000: 
378-80). 
 
 
A ‘Comprehensive Political Settlement’: From ICK to UNTAC 
 
There is no space here for detailed discussion of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements 
(PPA) or the UNTAC operation that deployed the settlement. Here I simply wish to 
show that, contra Michael Leifer’s (1999) argument that ASEAN was consigned to a 
marginal role during the peace process, with the great powers ultimately dictating 
policy, ASEAN had already devised many of the headline elements of the PPA in the 
early 1980s. 
 
The Third Indochina War seemed to confirm ZOPFAN’s basic premise, that great 
power involvement in regional politics was often disastrous for the region. As 
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister stated, ‘in principle, the Kampuchean problem is a 
conflict between Vietnam and the PRC’, but Thailand’s attempts to mediate between 
them was quickly rebuffed since the conflict went to the heart of the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry (Van der Kroef, 1984: 223).  ZOPFAN principles were referenced in the 1979 
UNGA resolution on the ‘Situation in Kampuchea’ which warned that ‘escalation of 
the conflict ‘increase[d] the danger of further involvement by outside Powers’, and 
from 1980 onwards, ZOPFAN was explicitly referenced, with the UN endorsing 
ASEAN’s model of regional security and calling for all states to implement it 
(A/RES/34/22; A/RES/35/6; A/35/PV.46: 827; A/35/PV.47: 846; A/RES/35/6).  
 
ZOPFAN’s realisation, however, depended on the satisfaction of powerful interests in 
Cambodia. Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn discussed how this 
might be achieved at Kuantan, Malaysia, in March 1980. The ‘Kuantan Declaration’ 
proposed a political settlement that ‘specifically recognised Hanoi’s security interests 
in Kampuchea’ (Van der Kroef, 1981: 516-7). Cambodia should be made neutral and 
non-aligned, with a maximum degree of autonomy, but Hanoi would exercise 
‘effective veto power over much of Cambodia’s defence and foreign policy’ (Peou, 
2000: 140). Van der Kroef (1984) referred to this plan as the ‘Finlandization’ of 
Cambodia, an attempt to trade off Cambodian sovereignty to achieve regional stability 
that clearly contradicts the Westphalian expectations of subaltern realism. Thailand 
and Singapore rejected the proposal not on the grounds that sacrificing Cambodian 
sovereignty was wrong in principle but on the grounds that it would ‘encourage’ 
rather than restrain Vietnam (Van der Kroef, 1981: 518).   
 
Nevertheless, the Kuantan principle, that Cambodia must sacrifice some of its 
sovereignty to achieve regional peace, survived in altered form and was enshrined in 
the notion of a ‘comprehensive political solution’, which entered ASEAN and UN 
vocabularies from 1980 onwards. This necessitated ‘guarantees against the 
introduction of foreign forces’ to the country and ‘that an independent and sovereign 
Kampuchea will not be a threat to its neighbours’ (A/RES/35/6). ASEAN’s 
campaigning for this option in a context of stalemate led the US, Japan, China, and 
even Vietnam to soon begin echoing the need for a ‘neutral’ Cambodia (Van der 
Kroef, 1984: 224-6) and, by the 1980s, they ‘took their cues on the Indochina issue 
from ASEAN communiqués’ (Simon, 1982a). The basic elements of the PPA and the 
UNTAC operation were identified in these communiqués and ASEAN-sponsored UN 
resolutions as early as 1980-81 (ASEAN, 1979; 1980; 1981; A/RES/34/22; 
A/RES/35/6; A/RES/36/5): 
 Total withdrawal of foreign troops, to be verified by the UN; 
 Appropriate measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law 
during the transitional period; 
 Respect for Cambodian self-determination, to be realised via democratic 
elections under UN auspices; 
 Repatriation rights for all refugees; and 
 The neutralisation of Cambodia, including guarantees against the introduction 
of foreign forces, respect for Cambodian sovereignty, and guarantees that 
Cambodia could never become a threat to its neighbours. 
 
These elements were enshrined in the 1981 Declaration of the International 
Conference on Kampuchea (ICK), for which ASEAN campaigned hard, and this 
became the basis for all future negotiations (UN, 1981), which included a series of 
‘Informal Meetings’ between the factions in Jakarta in the late 1980s which paved the 
way for the PPA (Prasad, 2001). Each element is reflected in the final settlement 
deployed by UNTAC (UN, 1991). Thus, while Leifer correctly noted that ASEAN 
states were too weak to enforce the settlement themselves and required the Permanent 
5 to steer the process to completion, many of the settlement’s core aspects were 
determined by ASEAN’s earlier political advocacy. Cambodia was re-born as a semi-
sovereign state, losing control over foreign policy decisions normally reserved for 
individual states, forced to ‘enshrine’ its ‘perpetual neutrality’ in its constitution, 
forbidden to host foreign bases or form alliances, and subject to renewed intervention 
if it ever compromised its neutrality in the future.  
 
This is not to argue that ASEAN was satisfied with all aspects of UNTAC. Indeed, 
they were alarmed by the depth to which the operation penetrated Cambodia’s state 
machinery and society, and ASEAN ambassadors repeatedly complained of 
UNTAC’s ability to ‘do things without ASEAN agreeing’. They successfully 
intervened to pressure Yasushi Akashi, the UN Special Representative in charge of 
the mission, not to use his extensive powers, which theoretically allowed him to make 
decisions when the Supreme National Council, the transitional embodiment of 
Cambodian sovereignty where all factions were represented, was deadlocked 
(Goulding, 2006).  
 
 
ASEAN Intervention in Post-War Cambodia 
 
ASEAN’s Post-Cold War ‘Projection’ 
 
China’s realignment with ASEAN dealt a coup de grace to most of ASEAN’s 
communist insurgencies, and the Soviet Union’s post-1986 retrenchment prompted 
Vietnam to launch doi moi (restructuring) and begin withdrawing from Cambodia: the 
Cold War in Asia was dying long before the Berlin Wall fell. Stripped of the certainty 
of ideological struggle, by the early 1990s ASEAN’s environment was characterised 
by uncertainty: Washington’s desire to maintain its military presence in East Asia, the 
intentions of China and India, the continuation of the liberal international trade regime 
on which ASEAN economies depended – all seemed questionable (Snitwongse, 1995; 
Weatherbee, 1993). The opportunity provided by the Cold War for ‘projection into 
the planetary game’, which was ‘a source of internal political cohesion because it 
allowed the state a central role’ (Laïdi, 1998: 19) had also vanished, replaced by the 
zeitgeist of ‘globalisation’, leading some to declare ‘the end of the nation-state’ 
(Ohmae, 1995). Furthermore, ASEAN states confronted new demands for political 
participation as a result of economic and social development (Robison and Goodman, 
1996).6 
 
ASEAN responded to these new uncertainties with a range of initiatives, including the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the 
expansion of ASEAN to cover all Southeast Asia (ASEAN-10). These moves 
reflected less a desire to achieve concrete goals than to maintain the abstract 
‘relevance’ of ASEAN so as to preserve its function as a diplomatic caucus, a shield 
for autocratic-developmentalist regimes against threatening global forces. AFTA and 
ASEAN’s membership of APEC was driven by a fear that ASEAN might be 
superseded by APEC or excluded by the apparent ‘bloc-ization’ of the global 
economy which threatened to divert the investment that ASEAN’s dirigiste regimes, 
and social order more broadly, relied upon (Weatherbee, 1993: 415; Chin, 1995: 426; 
Lim 1996). The ARF’s development was driven by the fear that large powers were 
about to initiate an Asia-Pacific security forum that would marginalize ASEAN or 
consign it to irrelevance (Acharya, 1995; Buszynski, 1998: 570). Its meetings 
explicitly focused not on moving towards a concrete telos or resolving specific 
problems but on enunciating procedural norms (Leifer, 1996) – what Laïdi (1998: 
154-6) calls ‘regionalism without a goal’.7 And ASEAN-10 was justified most often – 
in spite of the frequent physical incapacity of the proposed member-states, Burma, 
Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, to participate meaningfully in ASEAN activities (Chin, 
1995: 428)8 – not by reference to concrete benefits but to the supposed wishes of 
ASEAN’s founders. Hinting at the fundamentally reactive nature of ASEAN’s 
activities, Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad conceded, ‘if we appear to be in a hurry, it 
is only because ASEAN has little lead time to prepare itself against the growing 
challenges coming its way’ (Mahathir, 1992). 
 
This projection without a project produced a fundamental contradiction. ASEAN was 
basically unwilling to take responsibility for addressing concrete issues in the region, 
focusing instead on the procedure of the ‘ASEAN Way’, masking its inaction with the 
grand rhetoric of ‘community’ (Jones and Smith, 2002). But simultaneously, external 
actors who were themselves unwilling to take direct action were able to exploit 
ASEAN’s claims to manage regional order force ASEAN to intervene. 
 
From UNTAC to the 1997 ‘Coup’  
 Thailand’s ‘New Look’ policy, launched by Chatichai Choonhavan in 1988, aimed, 
now the threat of communism had evaporated, to ‘turn the Indochina battlefield into a 
trading market’, with a ‘Greater Thailand’ at the centre of a regional economic hub 
(Um, 1991: 246-8), Bangkok’s apparent willingness to recognise the PRK again 
giving the lie to any ‘principled’ stand. Although the suddenness of the move took 
other ASEAN states by surprise (Van der Kroef, 1990: 229), and was resisted by the 
Thai military, soon this policy of economic predation was replicated across the 
region.9 By the mid-1990s, ASEAN states were Cambodia’s major trading partners 
and, along with Japan, controlled most of its natural resources. Capital-starved 
Cambodia depended heavily on ASEAN, with Singapore investing $35m and 
Thailand, $47m. Malaysia became Cambodia’s largest foreign investor with total 
investments exceeding $109m (Moller, 1998: 1095; Peou, 2000: 373-4). 
 
ASEAN had a basic interest in safeguarding these investments by encouraging 
stability, which looked precarious by the mid-1990s. The 1993 elections produced a 
fragile coalition between the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by former PRK 
Prime Minister Hun Sen, and the royalist party FUNCINPEC (formerly Moulinaka) 
led by Prince Ranariddh, son of Prince Sihanouk. Hun and Ranariddh served as 
Second and First Prime Minister respectively, but the 1993 Electoral Law allowed 
only one Prime Minister to emerge from the 1998 elections. This, in addition to 
ingrained patronage systems, the lack of democratic culture, and profound 
disagreement about how to deal with renewed KR insurgency,10 fuelled conflict 
between these former sworn enemies (Roberts, 2002: 522-8; Findlay, 1995: 110). 
ASEAN’s interventions to maintain calm mainly took the form of threats of 
withdrawal. Malaysian Foreign Minister Badawi, dispatched to Phnom Penh in May 
1996, warned ‘against any escalation of violence and said that open hostilities would 
force ASEAN to leave Cambodia alone’. In December, Mahathir wrote to Hun and 
Ranariddh, ‘urging them to settle their differences and to ensure political stability in 
the country’. Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh made a pointed statement in November, 
stressing the continued need for stability if investment were to continue. Suharto 
himself led a large Indonesian delegation to Cambodia in February 1997 to repeat the 
ASEAN line on stability, while Philippine Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon began to 
raise doubts about Cambodia’s membership of ASEAN (Peou, 2000: 373-5). 
 
Nevertheless, in July 1997 the situation in Cambodia exploded into violence in what 
is usually referred to as Hun Sen’s ‘coup’ against Ranariddh.11 Critical accounts, 
however, show that Ranariddh had entered into military alliance with the KR and was 
smuggling arms and soldiers into Phnom Penh to overthrow Hun Sen. Indeed, the 
government troops that moved against Ranariddh did so on the orders of the bipartite 
Commission of Eight, established to manage tensions between FUNCINPEC and 
CPP, while Hun himself was vacationing in Vietnam (FT Asia Intelligence Wire, 
1997: 376-8; Kevin, 2000; Peou, 2000). Ranariddh fled to Paris, announcing a coup 
had taken place before a shot had been fired and calling for international intervention 
to depose Hun Sen and the renewal of civil war in league with the KR. 
FUNCINPEC’s war plan seemed to be to seize and hold Pochtenpong airport long 
enough for a hoped-for UN intervention force to arrive, while linking up with the KR 
at Anlong Veng (DPA, 1997a; FT, 1997b; Kyodo, 1997b; Kevin, 2000: 602). 
 
Although some ASEAN states airlifted their nationals from Phnom Penh, ASEAN’s 
initial reaction to these events was to avoid any mention of a ‘coup’, echoing calls 
from Japan, Europe and the US for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. ASEAN 
insisted that Cambodia’s entry to ASEAN, which (along with that of Laos and Burma) 
was due to be signed off later than month, would be unaffected. Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Ali Alatas stated: ‘in principle, the ASEAN commitment to admit the three 
countries has not changed’. Thailand’s Foreign Ministry insisted the events ‘would 
not affect Phnom Penh’s scheduled entry into ASEAN… the admission of Cambodia 
has already been decided’ (Xinhua, 1997c; Kyodo, 1997c).  
 
The Bind of Projection: The Imposition of Intervention 
 
However, Washington, Japan and the EU all insisted ASEAN use its ‘leverage’ to 
restore order. The US was particularly insistent, offering ‘advice’ to ASEAN prior to 
the emergency ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) summoned to discuss the crisis 
and insisting ASEAN ‘co-ordinate’ its position with Washington. The US swiftly 
suspended its humanitarian aid (followed by other donors) as a ‘clear signal to Hun 
Sen… that the US will not be conducting business as usual’ with him (Kyodo, 1997c; 
Xinhua, 1997c; The Nation, 1997d; BBC SWB (NHK TV), 1997; Guardian, 1997). 
The 10 July AMM joint statement (ASEAN, 1997b) illustrated that ASEAN had 
bowed to this external pressure: 
 
While reaffirming the commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states, [ASEAN] decided that, in the light of unfortunate circumstances which have 
resulted from the use of force, the wisest course of action is to delay the admission of Cambodia 
into ASEAN until a later date… The ASEAN countries stand ready to contribute their efforts to 
the peaceful resolution of the situation in Cambodia. 
 
The US, apparently unwilling to take direct action itself, was able to exploit 
ASEAN’s ‘projection without a project’, demanding that ASEAN’s claim to manage 
regional order be substantiated. Coming shortly after a huge furore over Burma’s 
planned accession to the Association, which severely damaged ASEAN-Western 
relations, and amidst growing dissatisfaction with ASEAN’s leadership role in the 
ARF,12 the Cambodian coup put ASEAN’s credibility on the line. ASEAN therefore 
assembled a ‘Troika’ comprising the Indonesian, Philippine and Thai foreign 
ministers, which assumed an uncomfortable mediating position, not only between the 
warring factions, but also between Cambodia and the West. The US established the 
‘Friends of Cambodia’ (FOC) group, comprising the major donor countries, 
ostensibly to ‘support’ ASEAN’s work, but in reality to supervise it. Washington 
insisted ASEAN ‘coordinate’ its position with the US and vowed to ‘use its leverage’ 
to ensure Hun Sen was dealt with (Kyodo, 1997a), with Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright and her deputy Stanley Roth making frequent visits to and demands of 
ASEAN states. The fact that the Troika always met a day prior to FOC but did not 
release its statements until it had consulted with FOC the next day clearly illustrated 
the power dynamic at work. 
 
The Troika’s first mission to Phnom Penh on 19 July generated considerable 
embarrassment because Hun Sen had already denounced ASEAN’s plans to ‘interfere 
in Cambodia’s internal affairs’, saying, ‘let us solve our problems on our own. Please 
stay out of our internal business’. He publicly rejected their intervention again on the 
eve of their arrival. Ali Alatas sought to get ASEAN off the hook, stating, ‘clearly, of 
this moment, our efforts will stop’, but it was not to be so easy (FT, 1997a; NST, 
1997; DPA, 1997b; Xinhua, 1997a). Just as the KR and FUNCINPEC were re-
launching costly civil war, the IMF suspended its $120m Structural Adjustment 
Programme, which comprised 20 per cent of the government’s budget, in addition to 
the 50 per cent constituted by now-suspended foreign aid. Donor withdrawal 
precipitated a collapse in investor confidence, with GNP growth slumping from 7 per 
cent in 1996 to zero by 1998. The ARF officially endorsed ASEAN’s lead on the 
issue and Washington piled pressure on Phnom Penh to invite ASEAN back, or lose 
international aid permanently. Further coercion was applied in September when 
Washington spearheaded a campaign to seat Ranariddh at the UN instead of Hun 
Sen’s candidate, producing an eventual comprise that left the seat vacant, thus 
stripping Cambodia once again of its international legitimacy.13 Under such 
circumstances it is unsurprising that the Troika was ‘invited’ to return, allowing 
ASEAN to operate coercively beneath the veneer of consent (Kevin, 2000: 595-6; 
Xinhua, 1997d).  
 
Intervention was thus imposed on both Cambodia and ASEAN, turning ASEAN into 
the reluctant gatekeeper to Cambodia’s international rehabilitation. The following 
sections briefly summarise the form intervention took, constituting ‘creeping 
conditionality’ for ASEAN membership – as soon as one condition was satisfied, 
another was imposed, largely because intervention not only failed to resolve the 
fundamental political conflicts that caused the crisis, but in fact exacerbated them. 
 
From ‘Caretaker Government’ to ‘Free and Fair Elections’ 
 
Despite Badawi’s promise that ASEAN would not act as the ‘international police’ by 
dictating to Cambodia and ‘would not put forward any proposal… because it may be 
misconstrued as interfering’ (Xinhua, 1997b), the Troika did in fact put forward a 
‘caretaker government’ proposal on its first visit to Phnom Penh. The suggestion that 
Hun Sen and Ranariddh both select deputies to run the government until elections 
scheduled for May 1998 were held was, as mentioned above, publicly denounced 
(Moller, 1998: 1097; Peou, 2000: 387).  
 
Taking its cue from Washington – Albright stated that FOC’s role was ‘to support the 
ASEAN initiative and to work to achieve free and fair elections in 1998’ (UPI, 1997) 
– ASEAN therefore shifted tack at its special AMM on 11 August, calling for ‘free 
and fair elections’ involving ‘all political parties’, and offering technical assistance. 
Ranarridh had by then been replaced as FUNCINPEC leader by Ung Huot following a 
vote on 6 August, but ASEAN refused to accept this on the grounds that ‘ASEAN 
member states recognise states, not governments’ (ASEAN, 1997a), a claim clearly 
falsified by ASEAN’s earlier policies on Cambodia. However, Thailand’s refusal now 
to support the renewed insurgency, and the AMM’s emphasis on ‘holding elections in 
1998 that outsiders will not be able to criticise’, illustrates well what was directly at 
stake: international credibility, rather than domestic social order (Peou, 2000: 389; 
BBC SWB (National Voice of Cambodia), 1997). 
 
ASEAN thus focused on encouraging the self-exiled politicians of FUNCINPEC and 
the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) to return home, mobilising UN resources to 
safeguard their return, and putting forward ceasefire proposals to end civil conflict. 
The sticking point was Hun Sen’s insistence on trying Ranariddh for his crimes 
(Antara, 1997b, 1997a). ASEAN’s efforts were, however, cut short by the Asian 
financial crisis, which, full-blown by October 1997, had devastating social, economic 
and political effects across the sub-region. The initiative largely passed from the 
Troika to Thailand, and Japan, which coordinated its efforts with ASEAN (The 
Nation, 1997a). In talks in Tokyo in November, Hun Sen agreed to a range of 
proposals, including pardoning Ranariddh to facilitate his participation in elections, a 
ceasefire, and guarantees for the safety of returning self-exiles (Peou, 2000: 397-8). 
Thailand stepped into the void left by the Troika by successfully pushing for the 
postponement of elections, visiting the factions and pressing for a ceasefire, and 
offering direct mediation in Bangkok (Mainchi Daily News, 1997; The Nation, 1997b, 
1997c; DPA, 1998a; Kyodo, 1998d). Hun Sen’s attempts to end the intervention in 
Cambodia by suggesting that ASEAN countries ‘should solve their own economic 
crises first’, and repeatedly hinting that he might withdraw Cambodia’s application to 
join ASEAN, were insufficient to rescue either side from the bind they found 
themselves in (Kyodo, 1998c; DPA, 1997c). There was simply too much at stake for 
Cambodia, facing a plunge back into civil war with insufficient resources to fight off 
the KR, to block ASEAN’s interference. Ranariddh was eventually coerced into 
returning to Cambodia when the EU, and then ASEAN, exploiting the room for 
manoeuvre this created (Washington opposed it), dropped their insistence on his 
personal participation as a condition for the recognition of election results (DPA, 
1998h, 1998g). After a ceasefire, trial date and pardon arrangements had been 
implemented, ASEAN states agreed to send eight election monitors each and to 
mobilise international financial support for the July 1998 elections (Xinhua, 1998d; 
DPA, 1998f). 
 
From Elections to Coalition Formation 
 
Alatas indicated there would be ‘no difficulties’ for Cambodia in gaining ASEAN 
membership after its elections (AFP, 1998b), a sentiment echoed by the other ASEAN 
foreign ministers (Asia Pulse, 1997; Xinhua, 1998b). Yet after the elections, a new 
condition was imposed: the formation of a coalition government. ASEAN’s 
interventions had merely forced Cambodia’s warring parties to participate in 
elections; they had not resolved the fundamental political conflict underlying the 
events of July 1997. The CPP gained 41.4 per cent of the vote, FUNCINPEC 31.7 per 
cent and SRP 14.3 per cent. While CPP was thus the biggest party, it lacked the 
parliamentary majority necessary to form a government and invited both opposition 
parties to form a coalition (DPA, 1998e). Rather than agreeing to negotiate, they 
exploited the international attention focused on Cambodia by rejecting the election 
results - certified by international observers as ‘free and fair’ (DPA, 1998d; FT, 1998) 
- holding demonstrations calling for armed international intervention to overthrow 
Hun Sen, and leaving the country to render the National Assembly inquorate and 
induce political paralysis (BBC SWB (Radio Australia), 1998; DPA, 1998c; Christian 
Science Monitor, 1998; Phnom Penh Post, 1998b; 1998a). Rather than creating 
political peace and stability, ASEAN’s interventions had facilitated this paralysis by 
allowing Ranariddh a new lease of political life, despite his plotting with the KR to 
overthrow the democratically-elected government, and granting FUNCINPEC and 
SRP enhanced bargaining power. ASEAN’s new condition – the formation of a 
coalition – both reflected the failure of intervention to bring stability to Cambodia, 
and exacerbated these problems. 
 
In a statement on 9 September, ASEAN called for ‘all parties’ to ‘resolve their 
differences in the spirit of national reconciliation… through dialogue and 
consultation… so that Cambodia would soon form a new government that fulfils the 
aspirations of the Cambodian people and the desire of the countries in the region’ 
(Xinhua, 1998a, emphasis added). Given that ASEAN states were themselves 
succumbing to international intervention in the form of predatory IMF ‘rescue’ 
packages (see Feldstein, 1998; Robison et al., 2000; Thakur, 2000), ASEAN relied on 
Thailand’s Sukhumbhand Paribatra to carry out intensive shuttle diplomacy between 
the parties, pushing them to enter into negotiations, backed by Japan, the EU and the 
US. Paribatra was eventually able to manoeuvre the factions into negotiations under 
Sihanouk, with a coalition agreement finally being announced three months after the 
elections. The extra leverage afforded by external intervention allowed Ranariddh to 
hold out for half the ministerial posts and the position of President of the National 
Assembly for himself (The Nation, 1998; Xinhua, 1998c; BP, 1998). A deal was also 
struck to create a Senate, to be chaired by a CPP official. 
 
From Coalition Formation to Senate Establishment 
 
Badawi claimed that ‘no more issues’ would block Cambodian membership after the 
formation of a government (Bernama, 1998), but as soon as the coalition deal was 
announced, ASEAN changed its conditions again in a further reflection of its 
unwillingness to take responsibility for Cambodia. After the AMM on 14 November, 
the Thai Foreign Ministry indicated that membership would now be conditional upon 
the constitutional amendment required to create the Senate (Kyodo, 1998b). The new 
condition was explained by reference to continued fears for Cambodia’s stability, with 
the Philippines noting there could be more ‘fighting among them. We will have to 
resolve it again. Others are saying “didn’t we get burned there already?”‘ (AFP, 
1998a). As the Straits Times noted, Cambodia’s entry could expose ASEAN to 
‘recrimination’ if the situation came ‘unstuck’, which would ‘damage ASEAN’s 
credibility’, especially in the wake of the financial crisis. The newspaper, often taken 
to express official sentiment in Singapore, suggested Cambodia needed the ‘discipline 
and restraint imposed by probation’, which should be extended for another year, with 
targets to ‘put the government’s integrity to the test’, including the formation of a 
Senate, military reform and the handling of international aid (ST, 1998b). 
 
The Singaporean government had aroused Indonesia’s wrath by insisting during the 
financial crisis that Jakarta should abide by the strictures of the Structural Adjustment 
Programme imposed upon it (Henderson, 1999: 62). With these strictures ‘striking at 
the heart’ of Indonesia’s social, economic and political power relations (Robison and 
Rosser, 2001: 179), it is perhaps unsurprising that Indonesia struck out at continued 
conditionality for Cambodia. Alatas asked, ‘since when should ASEAN sit in 
judgement about how governments work and make it a condition for entry? Did we do 
that when Vietnam entered, or Laos, or Myanmar, or before that Brunei Darussalam? 
We never said, “Well, I hope your government works and we will just see first…” I 
mean, this an additional conditionality [sic] that moves towards internal interference’ 
(DPA, 1998b). Malaysia, Brunei, Laos and Vietnam felt similarly, and the re-seating 
of Cambodia at the UN in December reduced ASEAN’s leverage substantially. 
Singapore’s Goh Chok Tong continued to insist on conditionality (ST, 1998a), 
publicly refuted by Alatas (Kyodo, 1998a).14 The bizarre face-saving compromise 
produced at ASEAN’s Hanoi summit in December reflected ASEAN’s deep disunity, 
with Cambodia being admitted to ASEAN but its formal admission ceremony being 
delayed until the Senate was formed (ASEAN, 1998; Severino 2006: 64). This 
resulted in ASEAN’s intervention outlasting that of the international donors, who 
began to negotiate new aid packages in February. That month, Paribatra embarked on 
yet another mission to Phnom Penh to push for swift progress on the Senate (Kyodo, 
1999), and with the constitutional amendment finally in place, Cambodia was 
formally admitted to ASEAN in April 1999, completing its international rehabilitation 
and ending ASEAN’s intervention in that country.15 
 
Conclusion 
 
ASEAN intervened in Cambodian affairs repeatedly over the twenty-year period 
considered by this article, undermining the claims of subaltern realism and 
constructivists that third-world states are passionately attached to an abstract principle 
of sovereignty. ASEAN’s emphasis on non-intervention was ultimately a political 
rather than a normative principle, expressing a defence of weak, capitalist regimes 
from subversion by separatist or communist movements being sponsored by outside 
powers. Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia threatened not simply an abstract principle 
of sovereignty (which ASEAN was not prepared to defend) but the political principle 
of the survival of ASEAN’s non-communist regimes. The intervention that followed 
illustrated ASEAN elites’ determination to defend the economic and political status 
quo. A similar argument could explain ASEAN’s defence of Indonesia’s annexation 
of East Timor in 1975. 
 
ASEAN’s interests in re-intervening in Cambodia in the post-Cold War era are much 
less clear. A basic interest in regional ‘stability’ and the safeguarding of investments 
in Cambodia do not seem sufficient to explain the institution of conditionality for 
membership in the Association for the first and last time in the group’s history. 
Compared to ASEAN’s earlier interventions – vociferous diplomatic campaigning, 
the formation of counter-regimes and the arming and supporting of guerrilla 
movements – ‘creeping conditionality’ was a rather tame approach, resisted by some 
of its members, that reflected ASEAN’s diminished interests. It was ASEAN’s claim 
to manage regional order that allowed external actors to compel it to intervene in the 
conflict, or risk this claim being discredited, with possible attendant consequences for 
the autonomy of ASEAN’s regimes in the face of global pressures. ASEAN has 
similarly been urged in recent years to push Burma towards democracy, and again it 
has had little choice but to comply, however ineffectually and reluctantly. ASEAN 
has been very reluctant to take on responsibility for problems arising within its new 
states; but the West’s own refusal to take on these problems directly themselves, 
preferring to use ASEAN to do its ‘dirty work’, suggests a similar reluctance to 
exercise power in the absence of obvious interests. 
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Ramcharan, 2000; Sucharithanarugse, 2000: 60). 
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of this topic, the lack of secondary material on some parts of the period, it has been necessary at times 
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the KR, a left-wing guerrilla group opposing the US-backed Lon Nol dictatorship. The KR swept to 
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‘Democratic Kampuchea’ (DK; ‘Kampuchea’ being closer to the phonetic sound of the country in 
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almost immediately after cementing his dominance, Pol Pot, in league with China (which Vietnam had 
turned against for Beijing’s excessive interference) began attacking Vietnam and persecuting ethnic 
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invading were not so much humanitarian (though it clearly had positive results for the Cambodian 
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borders constantly with significant loss of life and food security. 
5 These notations indicate UN documents. A indicates the General Assembly, 34 indicates the 34th 
session (1979), PV indicates provisional verbatim record, and the final number indicates the meeting 
number, followed by the page number. 
6 It is important to note, as Robison and Goodman et al. (1996) do, that the growth of urban middle 
classes in the region did not automatically produce demands for liberal democracy, as mainstream 
theorists of democratisation expected. Often the middle classes were in fact highly bound up in the 
illiberal power structures that had helped create them via massive state intervention. Nevertheless, 
these changes generally produced rising demand for political participation in some way, as well as 
protests against corruption and inefficiencies that hampered middle-class business interests. 
7 Some constructivists argue that the goal is in fact to ‘socialise’ China. Johnston (2003) provides the 
most convincing argument along these lines, but only succeeds in showing that a small office of 
bureaucrats has been effectively ‘socialised’. In any case such arguments are post-hoc rationalisations 
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the proximate causes of ARF’s establishment. 
8 By the mid-1990s there were over 220 meetings per year under ASEAN auspices. This presents a 
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which had few officials capable of speaking English (the international language of the region), and 
sometimes could not afford the initial membership contribution of $1m (and then $750,000 per anum 
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1995, with serious consequences for the peace process (Buszynski, 1994: 731; Doyle and 
Suntharalingam, 1994: 144-5; Findlay, 1995: 4, 94, 166-7; Frost, 1991: 130; Heinberger, 1994: 2; 
Jennar, 1994: 150), its dominance had been broken and the politics of economic predation superseded 
the ‘red scare’. 
10 The KR had refused to canton and disarm as required by the Paris Agreements, while the Cambodian 
government and the remaining resistance factions had. When the KR boycotted the 1993 elections and 
resumed their hostilities, they were thus able to make massive gains, controlling or imperilling up to 
                                                                                                                                            
half of the country by 1994. The renewed civil war cost the Cambodian government $185m, a third of 
its national budget, which was clearly unsustainable (Kevin, 2000: 600, n. 9; Peou, 2000: 240). While 
Hun Sen favoured selective amnesties, conditional upon the cessation of military and political 
activities, to encourage defections from the KR (a scheme that proved most controversial with the West 
but which had actually achieved its goal by the end of the 1990s), by May 1997 Ranariddh was 
suggesting bringing the KR directly back into Cambodian national politics. See: 
http://www.geocities.com/khmerchronology/1995.htm. 
11 This was the account favoured by Western media at the time and much academic writing since (e.g., 
Moller, 1998: 1097; Peou, 2000: 298). 
12 For instance, to China’s delight, ASEAN refused to allow the ARF to discuss directly the emerging 
territorial conflicts in the South China Sea in 1995. US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord said 
this called into question whether the ARF was a ‘credible organisation’. Japan was also looking for a 
forum to actually make progress on North-East Asian security issues, while the US even suggested 
transforming APEC into a defence forum because it was so dissatisfied with the ARF (Buszynski, 
1998: 572-5). 
13 ASEAN claimed to oppose the move, but apparently dared not vote against it, since the UNGA 
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14 Singapore’s views remained particularly important since it held the chair of the ASEAN Standing 
Committee, tasked with organising ASEAN’s business, which in this case included the organisation of 
the official membership ceremony for Cambodia. 
15 However, Cambodia’s long-term emiseration, to which ASEAN’s interventions clearly contributed 
by helping prolong armed conflict, has transformed the country into the ‘playground’ of international 
NGOs who seek to dictate government policy and manage democratic contestation (Dosch, 2006: 141-
60; Hughes, forthcoming). 
